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This article analyses IMF estimates of economic growth in 180 countries (IMF, 2009), and 
inks the results to the “Re-orient” approach, put forward by Frank, 1998. With global 
economic gravitation shifting to the Indian Ocean/Pacific region, the article also analyses the 
role of MNC (foreign capital) penetration as the key variable of past quantitative dependency 
studies for contemporary economic growth and social performance. In a Schumpeterian 
fashion, MNC penetration reflects the power, which transnational oligopolies wield over local 
economies. Today, social polarization and stagnation increase as a consequence of the 
development model, based on high MNC penetration. 
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1. Introduction 
“Re-Orient” (Frank, 1998) might be the catchword for the analysis of the world order, 
currently emerging from the profoundest economic crisis the world has seen since the 
Great Depression, which started in 1929. The current economic and social crisis is a 
temptation for social scientists to reconsider well-established assumptions of the 
discipline. The depth of the crisis, especially in the Northern-Euro-Atlantic region of 
our globe, and the apparent shift in the center of gravitation of the world economy 
away from the Atlantic towards the Indian and the Pacific Ocean will renew not only 
the interest in the later work of Frank, 1998, but also in the center-periphery models in 
the tradition of Prebisch, 1950, 1983, 1988, and dependency theories in the tradition of 
such authors as Cardoso, 1977, 1979, Cardoso/Faletto, 1971, Furtado, 1963, 1964, 
1976, 1983, Sunkel, 1966, 1973, 1978, and in the quantitative research inspired by 
these theories, namely by Galtung, 1971, Sunkel, 1973 and later Chase-Dunn, 1975, 
Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978 and Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, 1979. All these 
theorists claimed that relations of dependency block long-run economic growth and 
bring about a socially unbalanced development, short spurts of economic growth 
notwithstanding. Is dependency theory now put on its head, and is the former periphery 
and semi-periphery rushing ahead, while the center is stagnating? 
This study aims at investigating these fundamental issues. To start with, we look at the 
most recent IMF estimates and projections of economic growth. The world economy, to 
be sure, is confronting one of the biggest geographical shifts in its dynamics, 
resembling indeed the predictions of the “Asian age”, forwarded by Frank, 1998. Frank 
was, as it is well known, originally co-formulating the basic convictions of the 
dependency/globalization critical school (Frank, 1967). He later in his work decidedly 
believed that the centers of gravitation of the world economy will forever shift back 
again to the Asia/Pacific regions, which, according to him were always the world 
economic centers until around 1750.  
The master variable in this study is MNC penetration. It is measuring the share of the 
value of cumulated foreign direct investments by transnational corporations in the gross 
domestic product of the host country, and is thus reflecting the power, which 
transnational oligopolies wield over local economies (UNCTAD, World Investment 
Report, 2009). The present study is the first in the literature, linking MNC penetration 
in the mid 1990s and its growth until 2005 with social and economic development in 
our contemporary period and the current world economic crisis. 
Our approach is Schumpeterian in character. Schumpeter, 1908, 1912, 1939, 1950 
strongly believed that capitalist development takes the form of “creative destruction”; 
and that innovation by entrepreneurs/companies is the force that sustains long-term 
economic growth, even as it destroys the value of established companies that enjoyed 
some degree of monopoly power. The monopolistic power, wielded by transnational 
corporations over their host countries, is also a measure of the temporary market power 
of the waning market leaders, facing new inventions, championed by the global 
emerging competitors of the old centers in the North Atlantic arena, especially in China 
and India. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. In Section 2 we shortly outline the main 
theories under scrutiny here, namely Schumpeterian economic development theory; the 
five monopolies of the international system according to Amin, 1997; world system 3 
 
analysis in the tradition of Polanyi, 1957; Arrighi, 1995 and Wallerstein, 2000; the 
analysis by Frank, 1998; the dependency model, formulated by Cardoso, 1979; and the 
analysis of transnational capitalism and national disintegration according to Sunkel, 
1973. MNC dependency, reflecting the economic, social and political power of 
transnational oligopolistic corporations over their host countries as the key to analyzing 
contemporary changes is discussed in Section 3. The data, the development of the 
research design and the regression analyses are presented in Section 4. We report the 
empirical results in Section 5. A final section concludes this study. 
 
2. The main theories under scrutiny here 
The writings of Joseph Alois Schumpeter (Schumpeter, 1908, 1912, 1939), and later 
world system and dependency analyses by Amin, 1976, 1994, 1997; Bornschier, 1982; 
Cardoso, 1979, Cardoso/Faletto, 1971; Prebisch, 1950, 1983, and Sunkel, 2003, were 
always aware of the emergence of crises, cyclical imbalances, regional shifts and their 
possible causes and consequences, as well as of the rise and decline of entire regions 
and even continents in the process of capitalist development. The world economy thus 
returns to the “old Galicia” of 1909, when and where the young Schumpeter started his 
job as a University Professor in Czernowitz (then a German-language university on the 
very eastern outer rim of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, now Chernivtsi University in 
Northern Bukovina, Ukraine), gaining valuable insights into the nature of world 
development in the Galician periphery of the Empire, with all the “creative 
destruction”, which surrounded him. Several of his major works, like “The Nature and 
Essence of Theoretical Economics” (1908, translated 2009) “The Theory of Economic 
Development: An inquiry into profits, capital, credit, interest and the business cycle” 
(1912, first translated 1934) were all heavily influenced by his early and short 
experience at the outer rim (1909-1911) of the Empire. 
As it is well-known, according to Schumpeter, 1913, 1939 the entrepreneur is the prime 
mover of economic development, which is cyclic in character, connecting innovations, 
cycles, and development. Schumpeter strongly believed in the very long, 50-60 year 
economic cycles, the Kondratiev waves (for empirical studies on Kondratiev waves, see 
the posthumous editions of Kondratiev’s works in Kondratiev, 1980, 1984, 1998; for a 
general analysis Devezas, 2006; furthermore Bornschier, 1996; Goldstein, 1988; 
Tausch, 2007, 2008; for a skeptical view also Kuznets, 1940). Capitalist development 
takes the form of “creative destruction” (Schumpeter, 1950). Innovation by 
entrepreneurs/companies is the force that sustains long-term economic growth, even as 
it destroys the value of established companies that enjoyed some degree of monopoly 
power. Successful innovation is a source of temporary market power, eroding the 
profits and position of old firms, yet ultimately losing to the pressure of the new 
inventions, championed by the competitors (for a formal model of Schumpeterian 
growth economics, see Aghion/Howitt, 1992).  
Like many other development theories of the first generation of development 
economists after the Second World War, whose stars began to rise long after 
Schumpeter already went to America, Mandelbaum, 1945; Rosenstein-Rodan, 1964; 
Rothschild, 1944, and Singer, 1975; Singer and Ansari, 1988; Singer and Roy, 1993 all 
shared with Schumpeter the observation that capitalism never was a smooth 
equilibrium process. Mandelbaum, Rosenstein-Rodan and Singer, and the early 4 
 
dependency theorists in Latin America, whom they so heavily influenced, were deeply 
convinced that capitalism is NOT crisis-free growth, full employment, environmental 
sustainability and the end to social exclusion. 
The international system, more and more, seems to resemble such a perpetual rise and 
fall of companies, regions, sectors, even nations. Several world systems approaches 
have taken up the basic idea of the Schumpeterian competition and stipulated that even 
the international system itself since the 1450s is characterized by hegemonies, 
international system de-concentration, the de-legitimation of the international order, 
and recurrent global wars over the hegemony in the system (see Devezas, 2006; 
furthermore Arrighi, 1995; Goldstein, 1988; Tausch, 2007; Wallerstein, 2000). That 
currently economic growth dramatically shifts away from the North Atlantic arena and 
the states very closely linked to them to other regions of the world economy seems to 
indicate that such a major fundamental shift is taking place with the force of a real 
tsunami. Everywhere, the monopolies of power, which the old dominant transnational 
oligopolies wield, are eroding.  
Enlightening, as critical political economy might be in times of global crises, there are 
also some profound contradictions of the ongoing shifts in the global political economy 
with some of what seems today the all too narrowly and stable, geographically defined 
foundations of “dependency” and “world systems research”. Let us recall here that for 
dependency and later world systems theory, going back to the writings of its four 
“founding fathers” Amin, 1994; Arrighi, 1995; Frank, 1967; and Wallerstein, 2000, 
ascent and decline in world society is largely being determined by what Amin, 1977 
called the following ‘five monopolies’ of the international system: 
  the monopoly of technology, supported by military expenditures of the 
dominant nations 
  the monopoly of control over global finances and a strong position in the 
hierarchy of current account balances 
  the monopoly of access to natural resources 
  the monopoly over international communication and the media, and 
  the monopoly of the military means of mass destruction. 
Did these monopolies erode before the current global crash? Is their erosion 
instrumental in the current downfall of the North Atlantic Economy and its global 
allies? If we assume that the “five monopolies” were still in place in 2008, the 
hypothesis put forward by Amin of course does not explain us, when, how and why the 
global order is changing so rapidly nowadays, to the detriment of the centers (=holders 
of the five monopolies in 2008) and to the benefit of the periphery and semi-periphery 
during the global recession of 2009 and 2010. Let us also recall here that dependency 
authors generally explained backwardness and stagnation by the ever-growing 
dependent insertion of the global, ex-colonial South into the world economy. Starting 
with the writings Prebisch, 1950 their leading spokespersons all would stress the 
unequal and socially imbalanced nature of development in these regions. Short-term 
spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth in the countries of Africa, Asia and 
Latin America will be imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative 
current account balances.  5 
 
Later world system analyses – that started with the writings of the Austro-Hungarian 
socialist Karl Polanyi (Polanyi, 1957) after the First World War – also tended to 
confirm and expand this dependency argument (Wallerstein, 2000). Capitalism in the 
periphery, like in the centers, is characterized by strong cyclical fluctuations, and there 
are centers, semi-peripheries and peripheries. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries 
tends to be at the cost of another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy 
based on unequal transfer tends to remain stable.  
Frank decidedly put this eternal division of the world into centers and peripheries into 
fundamental question by maintaining in his re-analysis of global economic history, 
1998, that the centers’ fine hour of truth has come and that the centers will be 
dethroned by the new Asian/Pacific center of gravity of the world economy. 
Cardoso once, at the height of the debate, summarized the quantifiable essence of 
dependency theories as follows: 
  there is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist 
centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery 
  this produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral 
societies and between them and the centers 
  this leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery 
  this favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations, and 
  these require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the 
functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which 
contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance 
(Cardoso, 1979). 
The Chilean social scientist Osvaldo Sunkel, whose work is closely connected with the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (CEPAL/ECLA) was more 
cautious than most other dependency and world systems researchers by proposing in 
his ’Transnational capitalism and national disintegration (in Latin America)’ (1973) - 
the thought that transnational investment and integration might go hand in hand, under 
certain conditions, with an increasing global relative social polarization between rich 
and poor in the host countries of the evolving transnational system. In his 1973 essay 
he said: 
‘The advancement of modernization introduces, so to speak, a wedge along the area 
dividing the integrated from the segregated segments (...) In this process, some national 
entrepreneurs are incorporated as executives into the new enterprises or those 
absorbed by the TRANCO (i.e. transnational corporations), and others are 
marginalized; some professionals, forming part of the technical staff and the segment 
of employees are incorporated, and the rest are marginalized; part of the qualified 
labor supply and those that are considered fit to be upgraded are incorporated, while 
the remainder are marginalized. (…)Finally, it is very probable that an international 
mobility will correspond to the internal mobility, particularly between the 
internationalized sectors (...) The process of social disintegration which has been 
outlined here probably also affects the social institutions which provide the bases of the 
different social groups and through which they express themselves. Similar tendencies 
to the ones described for the global society are, therefore, probably also to be found 6 
 
within the state, church, armed forces, political parties with a relatively wide popular 
base, the universities etc.’ (Sunkel, 1973: 18-42). 
The world map of the estimates of economic growth in 2009 and 2010, which seem to 
confirm the fundamental shifts in world economic centers of gravity, and which 
underline the necessity to reflect some of the basic assumptions of the development 
theory discipline are shown in Map 1.A and Map 1.B. 
Insert Map 1.A on economic growth 2009 about here 
Insert Map 1.B on economic growth 2010 about here 
 
3. MNC dependency as the key to analyzing contemporary changes 
MNC penetration measures the different shares of GDP, which foreign capital 
investments have in the host countries, i.e. the UNCTAD percentages of the stocks of 
multinational corporation investments per total host country GDP. This research 
tradition has been especially developed by the Swiss sociologist Volker Bornschier and 
his school (Bornschier, 1976, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 2002, Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, 
1979, Bornschier/Chase-Dunn, 1985; Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978). MNC 
penetration captures the power, which international oligopolies wield in the different 
countries of the world system, and it also measures dependency theory as expressed in 
Sunkel, 1973 and Cardoso, 1979. 
There were dozens of attempts to quantitatively study this very simple and basic logic 
of dependency, which also can be linked to the formal economic models developed by 
the Polish political economist Michal Kalecki, many of them originally published 
already in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s (Kalecki, 1972, 1979, furthermore Rothschild, 
1954, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1964, 1965), stressing the linkage between monopoly power, 
the conditions of dependency (measured by Kalecki by raw material prices), and 
income distribution (measured by Kalecki by the wage share). A scientometric analysis 
of the vast empirical dependency-oriented research literature in the major international 
social science journals reveals that as of July 4
th, 2009, 328 major international studies 
quoted the path-breaking empirical dependency analysis by Galtung, 1971, which links 
dependency measured by trade partner concentration and the concentration of export 
products to the inequality of income distribution. Further 74 major international studies 
were based on the Sunkel essay, 1973, which is more directly linked to the concept of 
MNC penetration than the Galtung essay, 1971. Galtung, 1971 and Sunkel, 1973, in 
turn must be regarded as the catalyst essays for the two follow-up pioneering 
quantitative dependency studies, authored by Chase Dunn, 1975 [which had in turn 213 
follow-up studies], and Rubinson, 1976 [which yielded 170 follow-up studies in the 
major social science journals of the world to date]. Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 
based on Chase-Dunn, 1975, and Rubinson, 1978, later became the most important 
study in the field, systematizing research based on the concept of MNC penetration. 
This essay initiated 185 follow-up studies, while Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, devoted to 
the issue of economic inequality as a consequence of MNC penetration, originated 74 
follow-up studies
2. Later tests of the Bornschier hypotheses could nothing but support 
                                             
2 ISI Web of Knowledge, Thomson Reuters, as of August 20, 2009 7 
 
and refine the original argument, independently of the research design, for different 
indicators and different time periods and different samples and different methods (see 
inter alia Beer, 1999; Bornschier, 1982, 2002; Dutt, 1997; Heshmati, 2006b; Kentor, 
1998; Klitgaard R. and Fedderke J., 1995; Tausch, 2003; Tausch and Prager, 1993; Tsai 
1995, just to mention a few samples from this vast literature). 
It is important to emphasize here that MNC penetration must not be confounded with 
the Kearney-Index oriented research results on globalization; for MNC penetration 
measures the oligopolistic control of transnational corporations over local markets, 
while the Kearney index has much to do with openness, connectivity, and also 
infrastructure (see Kearney A. T. 2002; 2003; furthermore Addison/Heshmati, 2004; 
Heshmati, 2006a, 2007). The Kearney Index combines the dimension of foreign direct 
investment with government transfers; Gross Domestic Product; international 
organization membership; international travel; internet hosts; internet users; 
peacekeeping missions; population; remittances and personal transfers; secure Internet 
servers; telephone traffic; trade; and treaties. Not surprisingly, in 2007 the ten most 
globalized countries according to the Kearney methodology were Singapore, Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Ireland, followed by Denmark, the United 
States, Canada, Jordan and Estonia.
3 The typical peripheries and semi-peripheries of 
the world system are generally ranked very low on the Kearney index. The rank of the 
countries differ somewhat when a parametric approach is used where, unlike in the 
Kearney index, different weights are attached to different globalization index 
components (for details see Heshmati, 2006a). 
By and large, our present research results build on the original dependency theory 
arguments, reported in Bornschier/Chase-Dunn/Rubinson, 1978, and 
Bornschier/Ballmer-Cao, which both were based on analyses of the then “B-phase” in 
the waning Kondratiev cycle from 1960 to the mid 1970s, now being applied as well 
for the current period in the world economy. Our period (i.e. 2009 and 2010) is well 
comparable to the depression of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The fact that some later 
research results on MNC penetration, reported in the literature of the 1980s and 1990s, 
do not exactly correspond to other research results, must be qualified in the light of the 
following phenomena: 
  The time frame of the study in the 50-to 60 year long wave economic 
Kondratiev cycle and in the 18/22 year Kuznets cycles in the world economy 
since the oil crisis of 1973, with its very strong fluctuations  
  Differences of methods used and periods studied 
  The sample composition of the study by location and level of development of 
countries, and 
  The influence of other predictors, like development level, urbanization rate etc. 
Arguments in the literature, which stress that cycle space and time play an important 
role in the logic of development, can be already found, among alia, in Bobróvnikov, 
2004, and Bornschier, 1996. Cycle time requires certain conditions to be fulfilled to be 




able to be responsive to a development wave and attraction of development forces. Our 
study is the first world-system-wide study in the literature, linking MNC penetration in 
the mid 1990s and its growth until 2005 with social and economic development in the 
contemporary world economic crisis. 
Our geographical presentation of contemporary MNC penetration, based on UNCTAD 
World Investment Report data, will be kept to a minimum. In general terms, we observe 
today high levels of MNC penetration = high power concentration in the hands of the 
transnational corporations over the economies of their host countries in Western 
Europe, in some parts of Eastern Europe, in many parts of Latin America, Africa, and 
in Southeast Asia. MNC penetration is reported in Map 2.A and Map 2.B. 
Insert Map 2.A on MNC penetration 2006 about here 
Insert Map 2.B on MNC regional penetration about here 
While different authors disagree on the direction of the influence of MNC penetration 
on the human condition, most would underline the strong influence of MNC 
penetration on control of the natural resources, assets distribution and ownership, as 
well as employment, economic growth, income inequality and income distribution, 
technology, management and skill transfer and the overall development of nations. 
 
4. Data and research design 
The design of our study is based on usual, statistical package SPSS-XV ordinary least 
square (OLS) standard regressions of the “kitchen sink type” (Durlauf et al., 2008) of 
economic growth and economic and social performance in the research tradition of 
Barro, 2003. The SPSS-OLS standard regressions specify a critical inclusion criterion 
of PIN = 5% error probability and POUT = 10% error probability. 
In keeping with the research tradition, initiated by Seers/Öström, 1983; Seers, 1981; 
Seers/Schaffer/Kiljunen, 1979; and Seers/Vaitsos/Kiljunen, 1980 about 
“underdeveloped Europe” we however believe that it is impossible to separate the 
effects of MNC penetration on the “center” and on the “periphery”, because 
center/periphery problems nowadays characterize the entire world economy and 
because the (former) centers, more and more, exhibit characteristics of semi-
peripheries. 
 
4.1 The data 
The source of data used in this study is secondary databases of the United Nations 
organizations databases and foremost those managed by the IMF, UNCTAD, UNDP, 
UN Statistics and the USA-CIA. It contains all major countries with available socio-
economic data on growth and its determinants. The choice of a country to be included 
in the final analysis (originally 183 countries
4) coincides with the availability of data 
from our standard sources for socio-economic comparative growth and development 
                                             
4 For a list of the sample countries see Appendix Table 1. 9 
 
analysis. For more details on the data sources and list of variables see data sources for 
selected variables of the final model. 
Insert Appendix 1 Data sources about here 
The data contain a number of key variables on development and its indicators. These 
are grouped into development performance as dependent variables and determinants of 
development as explanatory variables. The six development performance variables 
include: 
  Economic growth, 1990-2005 
  Life expectancy at birth 2000/2005 
  Unemployment rate, latest available year (by around 2003/2004) 
  RAT2020: quintile ratio (difference in the incomes between the richest and the 
Poorest 20% in society, by around 2003/2004) 
  Growth projection for 2010 (IMF) 
  Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) by around 2005 
The determinants of development performance listed above are selected among the 
followings: 
  Percent world population (by around 2004) 
  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
  MNC PEN increase in MNC penetration 1995 - 2005 
  MNC PEN 1995 
  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
  Public education expenditure per GDP (by around 2003) 
  ln GDP per capita in PPP $ and its square (by around 2003) (ln GDP/capita in 
PPP)
2 
The data covering all the sample of 183 countries are presented in alphabetic order, and 
all of the 6 dependent and the 7 independent variables at a glance are reported in 
Appendix 2. In order to conserve space, the square of lnGDP per capita (natural 
logarithm of GDP per capita) is excluded from the table. We find significant variations 
in the level of the variables among the countries. The data and its variations across 
countries are further discussed in the section on the analysis of the results.  
Insert Appendix 2 data at a glance about here 
 
4.2 The models 
The development performance model is specified as a function of the determinants of 
growth written as: 




i ji j i X DevPerform
1
0     10 
 
where DevPerform represents each of the six development performance variables listed 
above for country i and X is J vector of determinants of development performance 
listed above, some of which are logarithmic, while others expressed in level or 
percentages. The  j   and 0 are unknown parameters to be estimated to infer about the 
association and impact of the determinant of the development indicator. The   is a 
random error term assumed to have a mean zero and constant variance. It captures the 
measurement error in the dependent variable and the effects of left out explanatory 
variables. 
Due to the possible problems of multicollinearity between the explanatory variables 
and its effects in form of confounded effects of determinants and the difficulties in 
separation of the effects we used a univariate analysis instead of a multivariate 
regression analysis (equation 1) where the model is written as: 
(2)   i ji j i X DevPerform       0  
where each of the components is defined previously.  
 
5. Analysis of the results 
The final models are based on multivariate regression analysis estimating the effects of 
the determinants of growth simultaneously and conditional on other determinants. In 
multivariate regression analysis, multicollinearity can be a serious problem.  
 
5.1 The estimation results 
In order to isolate individual factors effects of economic growth (measured as GDP per 
capita) we also utilize the univariate approach as well. It helps to identify the 
significant predictors of the dependent variables. Here the set of dependent and 
independent variables are the same as those presented previously. The independent 
variables are classified both as dimensions and their corresponding variable labels. The 
unconditional beta weights and error probabilities are reported in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 on univariate analysis about here 
The results show, with the exception of few cases that the relationships between each 
pair of variables are statistically highly significant. In addition to the indication of 
significant relationships, the nature of a positive or negative relationship and its 
strength is also indicated. The relationship between our six development performance 
variables and the logarithm of GDP per capita and its square as explanatory variables 
are presented in Graphs 1.A-1.F. This is to capture the non-linearity in their 
relationships.  
Insert Graph 1.A-F on non-linear relationships about here 
GDP per capita and IMF predicted growth 2010 are negatively and linearly related, 
suggesting that the prediction is based on a simple linear relationship. A minor non-
linear and positive relationship is observed between GDP per capita and economic 
growth 1990-2005 and life expectancy and a negative relationship between GDP per 
capita and inequality was found. GDP per capita is highly nonlinearly related to the 
under-five mortality rate and the unemployment rate. The former is U-shaped, while 11 
 
the second has an inverted U-shaped relationship. The fit of the models measured as R
2 
is in the interval between 0.053 and 0.653, suggesting a good fit and a large share of the 
total variations in the development performance variable being explained by GDP per 
capita and its square. 
The results from the 42 SPSS-XV standard OLS regression coefficients, their 
standardized errors, beta-weights, t-values and error probabilities to measure the effects 
of the 7 predictor variables on the 6 dependent variables are presented in Table 2. The 
table is divided into 6 different panels each, for each development performance 
variable. The models fits measured by adjusted R
2 and degrees of freedom are reported 
at the end of each panel. The adjusted R
2 is in the interval between 0.193 and 0.663, i.e. 
19.3% and 66.3%, indicating the share of the total variation in the dependent variable 
explained by the set of explanatory variables. A joint F-test for the significance of the 
slope parameters is also reported, suggesting that the null hypothesis of zero effects is 
being rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis, representing the appropriateness of 
the current specification of the model.  
Insert Table 2 on the OLS estimation results about here 
 
5.2 Interpretation of the quantitative results 
Let us first look more precisely at the quantitative results. First we turn to economic 
growth 1990-2005. Without the effects of the predictor variables, the 138 countries 
with complete data under investigation here would be in a severe recession (almost -
12%, but the effect is not significant); and significant effects on the growth rate, at a 
5% significance level, are being wielded by the share of the country in world 
population (beta +0.200), MNC Penetration (beta +0.347) and public education 
expenditures (beta -0.275). Our equation explains 24.3% of economic growth 1990 to 
2005. The effects, which are significant at the 10% level, include the negative effects of 
population growth and increases of MNC penetration over time.  
Our next equation explains the income difference between the richest 20% and the 
poorest 20% of the population. Without the influence of the predictor variables, 
inequality would be -172; this effect is statistically highly significant. Our equation for 
the 114 countries with complete data explains 26.4% of total variance. Apart from the 
well-known effect of rising income inequality at middle levels of development and 
declining inequality thereafter, associated in the literature with Kuznets, 1955 and 
1984, we observe significant effects of rising inequality, caused by population growth, 
MNC penetration, and public education expenditures, and the mitigating effects of 
rising MNC penetration over time, possibly due to the short-term employment effects 
of MNC capital inflows. It must be noted however that DYN MNC PEN does not have 
a significant effect on official unemployment rates (see below), which suggests the 
possibility that the inequality mitigating short term effects of fresh MNC inflows are 
mainly caused by changes in the pay structure of the industrially employed, official 
labor force. 
The following equation – which explains 62.4% of total variance for the 141 countries 
with complete data – is featuring the determination of life expectancy. Apart from the 
well-known “plateau curve of basic human needs” (Goldstein, 1985), caused by ln 
GDP per capita and its square, we are confronted with the following negative effects, 12 
 
which are all significant at the 10% level: population growth, MNC penetration, and 
public education expenditure. Without the influence of our predictors, life expectancy 
would be -43 years, but this effect is not significant. 
Our analysis for unemployment rates with 127 countries with comparable and complete 
data suggests that 19.3% of the total variance of the unemployment rate in the different 
countries of our globe can be significantly explained by the unemployment increasing 
effects of public education expenditures, the modernization process (ln GDP per 
capita), and the unemployment mitigating effects of “modernity” (ln GDP per 
capita^2). Also, there is an unemployment increasing effect, which is significant at the 
10% level, wielded by MNC penetration. Without the effects of our predictors, 
unemployment would be -109%; this effect is significant. 
Our analysis of the determinants of predicted economic growth in the year 2010, which 
was calculated for 140 countries, and explains 40% of the total variance of the variable, 
reflects the enormous weight, which demographic dynamics will play in the future of 
the world economy. Both the big markets with very huge populations (beta +0.187), as 
well as countries with a high population growth rate (beta +0.460) will benefit from 
high rates of economic growth in 2010. These variables are significant at the 5% level; 
in addition, MNC penetration negatively determines future economic growth (beta -
0.132, error probability 6.5%). Without the effects of our predictors, predicted growth 
in 2010 would be negative (recession of -3.3%). 
Our last analysis deals with under-five mortality rates. It was calculated with the 
complete, comparable data from 141 countries. Without the effects of the predictor 
variables, under-five mortality would be 1242, and this effect is significant. Again, the 
“plateau curve of basic human needs”, discovered by Goldstein, 1985, plays an 
important role, with ln GDP per capita and its square determining a good part of the 
entire variance of under-five mortality rates. The entire variance explained by our 
equation is 66.3%. The other significant negative effects wielded on the variable are 
being caused by population growth and MNC penetration. 
5.3 The results linked to the theories 
So, the development logic of different economic cycles seems to shift indeed from 
cycle to cycle, and the pre-crisis world of the “golden days” of the post-1989/90 boom 
seemed to correspond to a logic, where high foreign capital penetration seemed to 
guarantee a long-run, but socially unbalanced economic growth. Foreign capital 
inflows did not result in immediate spurts of growth, but were rather first of all 
destroying, in a Schumpeterian fashion, existing economic structures. After the end of 
Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, this global model, which seemed to dominate 
the global economy before the crash of 2008/2009, and which combined relatively 
rising rates of inequality, material poverty (measured with deficient life expectancy 
rates and relatively high under five mortality rates) with rapid economic growth, 
reflected in a way the boom years after the military coup in Brazil in 1964. This was 
the model, in which East Central Europe was the main area of expansion of global 
capitalism. Krasilshchikov (2008) analyzed this logic with his comparison of post-
Communist Russia with Brazil during the heyday of dependent development. 
But the new world structure of the post-crisis years, which now seems to emerge from 
the ruins of the post 1975/82 long economic cycle, will in many ways even more 13 
 
resemble the world, predicted by Bornschier at the time, because also projected 
economic growth during the global crisis is now negatively determined – with at least a 
6.5% error probability – by past MNC penetration. Thus the earliest formulations of 
quantitative dependency, written in the late 1970s, gain absolutely in relevance 
nowadays again at the precise long economic cycle time, which we face, and which is 
similar to the mid 1970s. 
So, the often-hailed beneficial effects of foreign capital penetration nowadays even less 
materialize than ever before. As correctly predicted by the vast majority of the MNC 
penetration quantitative dependency literature, social polarization dramatically 
increases by a development model, based on a very high foreign capital penetration. 
The significant negative development policy effects on the development performance 
in our present study are on equality, life expectancy, employment and the reduction of 
under-five mortality. Fresh inflows of foreign capital somewhat alleviated inequalities. 
The demographic dimension of our results also has to be taken into account. We show 
that large markets with numerous inhabitants, both in the period of 1990-2005, as well 
as in 2010, are significantly and positively connected with growth performance. Annual 
population growth, however, is significantly contributing to the deficits in basic human 
needs satisfaction, inequality, and to stagnation in the past period of economic growth, 
1990-2005. But with the current world economic shifts to the global Southeast, high 
population growth rates significantly and positively contribute to the future growth 
performance of a country in 2010. 
Ever since the writings of Colemann (1965), education should also be mentioned 
among the determining variables of the development performance of a country. 
Education and human capital formation figure prominently in the "Human 
Development Reports" of the United Nations Development Programme as variables, 
which determine positively the development outcome. For the UNDP it has been self-
evident over the last decade that gender empowerment and the re-direction of public 
expenditures away from national defense will positively contribute to a positive 
development outcome. However, neo-liberal thought correctly would caution against 
such premature conclusions. Weede, 2002, 2004 has shown that standard indicators of 
human capital endowment - like literacy, school enrollment ratios, or years of 
schooling - suffer from a number of defects. They are crude. Mostly, they refer to input 
rather than output measures of human capital formation. Occasionally, Weede believes, 
they produce implausible effects. They are not robustly significant determinants of 
growth. Weede replaced them by average intelligence. This variable consistently 
outperforms the other human capital indicators in spite of suffering from severe defects 
of its own. Public education expenditures in our model negatively affect economic 
growth (1990-2005), equality, life expectancy and employment. University reform and 
University privatization would be important political steps to achieve a more viable 
development.  
Now let us move towards the dimension of development history. This often puzzling 
question can here be answered in the following sense. Modernization – i.e. rising 
income levels (ln GDP per capita) have the strong expected following positive effects 
on the development performance: basic human needs satisfaction (life expectancy and 
reduction of under-five mortality). However, modernization contributes to a significant 
increase in inequality and unemployment. 14 
 
Economic maturity, or if you wish and prefer, modernity, i.e. ln GDP/capita
2, is good 
for the following performances: equality, and employment. The contradictions of 
modernity are largely to be found in what Goldstein already called in 1985 the “plateau 
curve of basic human needs”, basically constraining life expectancy and infant 
mortality reduction at very high levels of development, mainly due to the 
environmental and psychological strains of modern, urban life. 
 
5.4 Major issues to be raised 
At this point, four major issues should be raised in the discussion of our results, 
achieved so far, and which might be interesting subjects for future research. 
Krasilshchikov, 2008 highlighted the fact that dependency not always blocks 
development. Krasilshchikov starts from the assumption that rapid economic growth in 
China can be seen as a kind of “associated-dependent development” in the sense of 
Cardoso/Faletto, 1971, because “China has found niches in the economies of the 
western countries where mass production of many ordinary goods is already non-
advantageous for the capital of the core”
5. The same applies, according to 
Krasilshchikov, to the take-off of the Asian "tigers" in the 1960s-80s. Their export 
expansion would have been impossible without the structural changes in the western 
economies. For Krasilshchikov, dependency theory in all its versions was elaborated in 
the conditions when the peripheral/semi-peripheral countries and the developed ones 
belonged to the “same, industrial, capitalist mega-stage of development”. Today, we 
see the rise of a post-industrial social formation in the most advanced countries. At the 
same time, China, Brazil, and other countries continue to follow an industrial path of 
development.  
Another point, closely connected to the first, is the unfettered rise in the model of 
“export processing zones”, especially in China and Southeast Asia. The first major 
international study by Froebel/Heinrichs/Kreye, 1980 was followed, among others, by 
Ross, 2004; and Singa-Boyenge, 2007. Export Processing Zones (EPZ) – or „Free 
Production Zones“ today already account for some 80 percent of the merchandise 
exports of countries like China, Kenya, the Philippines, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Senegal, Tunisia, Vietnam. 3500 EPZs in 130 countries of the world now employ 66 
Million people, among these 40 million employees in China. The tendency, correctly 
foreseen by Froebel/Heinrichs/Kreye, 1980 towards a total global re-location of world 
industries continues unabated. Future research could determine the quantitative 
weights, which different forms of dependency have in the determination of future, 
projected economic growth rates (% of the population working in export processing 
zones versus MNC penetration versus the Kearney globalization index versus % of the 
GDP constituted by MNC outward foreign direct investment et cetera.). 
In the face of the very huge statistical influence, to be ascribed to the demographic 
variables, the third point concerns the influence of family and household patterns, 
generational cohorts, and value change. Already the classic Arab philosopher Ibn 
Khaldun (1332-1406) (Ibn Khaldoun, 2005), who must be regarded as one of the 
founders of global sociology, foresaw the tendency towards economic cycles, which he 
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linked, quite in a modern fashion, to what contemporary sociology would call “value 
change” (Inglehart/Norris, 2003; Norris/Inglehart, 2004) or – in the case of Ibn 
Khaldoun – value decay. The rise and fall of a societal order (or macro-cycle?) is 
intrinsically linked to the rise and fall of generations of human people. For Khaldoun, 
the life cycle of a societal model is linked to the ups and downs of exactly four human 
generations i.e. 80 to 100 years – from the building-up of an order by the “founding 
fathers/mothers” (1945?), to the phase of societal maturity during the tenure of societal 
power by the second generation (1965/70?), the onset of decline during the tenure of 
the third generation (1985/2005?), and the final destruction and end during the fourth 
generation (2005/2030?). Contemporary quantitative Kondratiev cycle researchers, like 
Rennstich, 2007, stumbled onto the issue again, without duly taking into account the 
theoretical forerunner Ibn Khaldoun, and linking the four generation cycle to the 
Nobel-laureate winning four generation family sage “Buddenbrooks. The Decline of a 
family” by the German novelist Thomas Mann (Mann, 1924), and calling the four-
generation cycle the Buddenbrooks cycle. According to the Buddenbrooks cycle 
thought the novel contains a dire and general message for societal systems and is a 
model of analysis, also to be applied to the contemporary, post-World-War II world 
order. Independently of Rennstich, Devezas/Corrodine, already in 2001 developed on 
the basis of long-range demographic and sociological data a mathematical model, also 
based on the four-generation “model”. Schumpeter, in his rather conservative and 
pessimistic interpretation, also touched upon this issue in his 1950 “Capitalism, 
Socialism and Democracy”, when he stated that capitalism will not disappear from the 
face of the earth by a socialist revolution, but by the gradual erosion of capitalist 
individual family values and the rise of a socialist-oriented intellectual elite and 
bureaucracy. Indeed, the decline of the demographic base of Western societies 
castigates the West in the emerging new global order with a vengeance. And at any 
rate, the demographic variables play an important part in our empirical explanation of 
future expected economic growth. The effect of annual population growth on the 
expected economic growth rate in 2010 is 5.8 greater than the standard error of the 
coefficient. 
The fourth and last point to be touched upon here is the necessary switch in the 
international Huntington debate and contemporary Islam-bashing – away from 
Huntington, the Islam critic, 1996 perhaps towards the Huntington of 1968, the 
modernization pessimist. Prudent Arab banking, remindful of the Holy Quran 
prescriptions about interest, nowadays overtakes New York as the global financial 
center; and most Muslim countries – with a few exceptions – have become growth 
superstars in the ongoing crisis. The re-orientation of the world along the map proposed 
by Frank, 1998, also implies that the Indian Ocean – and with it the vast area of the 
world, deeply influenced by Islam and Muslim culture, becomes again the center of the 
world economy, as it always was until 1450. 
 
6. Conclusions 
By focusing on MNC penetration as the measure, reflecting the power, which 
transnational oligopolies wield over the local economies, we have tried to free 
dependency and world systems research from some neo-Marxist connotations, which 
might have surrounded that concept in the past and which perhaps were mainly 16 
 
responsible for the fact that the concept so well entered the core-research agenda of 
global political science and sociology, but failed to influence the course of the debate in 
the major mainstream economics journals. By giving the concept a Schumpeterian 
interpretation, we are also free to understand the dramatic changes, currently taking 
place in the world economy. 
We have shown in this article these enormous geographical shifts, which currently take 
place, and which make the predictions of the “Asian age”, forwarded by Frank, 1998 
come true almost over night. After the end of Communism in Eastern Europe in 1989, 
the model which emerged on the ruins of the Berlin Wall and took shape on a global 
scale combined relatively rising rates of inequality, material poverty (measured with 
deficient life expectancy rates and relatively high under-five mortality rates) with rapid 
economic growth. But in a Schumpeterian creative-destructive fashion, the countries 
formerly under strong control of the oligopolies (especially East Central Europe) are 
now being severely castigated in turn, while economic growth is being transplanted to 
the new growth regions of the Eastern part of the Indian Ocean, China, Southeast Asia 
and the Arab new global financial centers. As Arrighi correctly predicted in 1995, all 
major cyclical terminal crises also and above all mean a geographical transfer of the 
global financial centers, constituted in the history of global capitalism by Genoa, 
Amsterdam, London, then New York, and now the Arab financial centers. 
Because of the negative influence of both high MNC penetration and low demographic 
dynamics, our investigation is especially pessimistic for the new member countries of 
the European Union in East Central Europe. They combine all the ills of our 
investigation at once – a high rate of control of their economies by transnational capital, 
a low population growth rate, a shrinking and already small share of world population, 
and an education system, which was, unlike the coal mines and the shipyards, largely 
left in state hands and is based on a dwindling resource base. Whether democracy can 
survive under such strenuous conditions, is another matter, beyond the theme of this 
essay. For Western Europe, faced by the partial collapse of the fruits of reconstruction 
policy and the European Union enlargement in Eastern Europe, prospects are also very 
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Table 1: Significant predictors of development. 
Dimension variable  lable beta-weight  error 
probability
dependent variable 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  0.347 0.000 growth 1990 – 2005 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  0.193 0.045 Inequality 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  0.102 0.047 under five mortality 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  -0.132 0.065 growth 2010 (IMF) 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  0.162 0.066 Unemployment 
dependency from MNCs  MNC PEN INWARD  -0.097 0.083 life expectancy 
    
increases in MNC PEN  DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.185 0.047 Inequality 
increases in MNC PEN  DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.159 0.059 growth 1990 – 2005 
    
market size  % world population  0.187 0.007 growth 2010 (IMF) 
market size  % world population  0.200 0.011 growth 1990 – 2005 
    
Demography Annual  population  growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
0.460 0.000 growth 2010 (IMF) 
Demography Annual  population  growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
0.415 0.001 Inequality 
Demography Annual  population  growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
0.143 0.017 under five mortality 
Demography Annual  population  growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
-0.179 0.054 growth 1990 – 2005 
Demography Annual  population  growth 
rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
-0.107 0.092 life expectancy 




expenditure per GNP 




expenditure per GNP 




expenditure per GNP 




expenditure per GNP 
-0.097 0.087 life expectancy 
    
Modernization ln  GDP  5.356 0.000 Inequality 
Modernization  ln GDP  -4.688 0.000 under five mortality 
Modernization ln  GDP  5.169 0.000 Unemployment 
Modernization  ln GDP  2.189 0.007 life expectancy 
    
Modernity ln  GDP^2  -5.269 0.000 Inequality 
Modernity  ln GDP^2  4.035 0.000 under five mortality 
Modernity ln  GDP^2  -5.367 0.000 Unemployment 





Table 2: The OLS estimation results 
1. Economic Growth 1990-2005  Beta std  error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob 
Constant -11.895 9.620 xx  -1.236  0.219
%  world  population  0.186 0.072 0.200 2.596 0.011
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0.338 0.174 -0.179 -1.942  0.054
MNC PEN INWARD  0.033 0.008 0.347  4.263  0.000
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.014 0.008 -0.159  -1.904  0.059
public education expenditure per GNP  -0.315 0.093 -0.275  -3.406  0.001
ln  GDP  3.138 2.218 1.629 1.415 0.160
ln GDP^2  -0.154 0.127 -1.397  -1.218  0.226
F-test=7.277, R2 adj 0.243, n=138     
2. Inequality  Beta std error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob
Constant -172.157 41.478 xx  -4.151  0.000
% world population  -0.216 0.278 -0.065  -0.777  0.439
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
3.287 0.978 0.415 3.362 0.001
MNC PEN INWARD  0.080 0.039 0.193  2.031  0.045
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.068 0.034 -0.185  -2.012  0.047
public education expenditure per GNP  0.836 0.405 0.183  2.062  0.042
ln  GDP  39.910 9.528 5.356 4.189 0.000
ln GDP^2  -2.261 0.546 -5.269  -4.141  0.000
F-test=6.776, R2 adj 0.264, n=114     
3. Life Expectancy  Beta std error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob
Constant -43.401 31.747 xx  -1.367  0.174
%  world  population  0.027 0.238 0.006 0.113 0.910
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0.927 0.546 -0.107 -1.698  0.092
MNC PEN INWARD  -0.043 0.025 -0.097  -1.745  0.083
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  0.031 0.025 0.072  1.244  0.216
public education expenditure per GNP  -0.531 0.309 -0.097  -1.722  0.087
ln  GDP  19.911 7.323 2.189 2.719 0.007
ln GDP^2  -0.754 0.419 -1.445  -1.801  0.074
F-test=34.233, R2 adj 0.624, n=141     
4. Unemployment  Beta std error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob
Constant -109.356 27.734 xx  -3.943  0.000
% world population  -0.239 0.202 -0.099  -1.186  0.238
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
-0.111 0.484 -0.022 -0.230  0.818
MNC PEN INWARD  0.041 0.022 0.162  1.857  0.066
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.008 0.021 -0.033  -0.367  0.714
public education expenditure per GNP  0.782 0.274 0.251  2.859  0.005
ln  GDP  27.537 6.379 5.169 4.317 0.00033 
 
ln GDP^2  -1.635 0.363 -5.367  -4.500  0.000
F-test=5.305, R2 adj 0.193, n=127     
5. Growth 2010 (IMF)  Beta std error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob
Constant -3.343 10.673 xx  -0.313  0.755
%  world  population  0.220 0.080 0.187 2.752 0.007
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
1.060 0.184 0.460 5.772 0.000
MNC PEN INWARD  -0.015 0.008 -0.132  -1.860  0.065
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  0.012 0.008 0.104  1.397  0.165
public education expenditure per GNP  0.155 0.104 0.107  1.488  0.139
ln  GDP  1.521 2.463 0.631 0.617 0.538
ln GDP^2  -0.132 0.141 -0.952  -0.934  0.352
F-test=14.239, R2 adj 0.400, n=140     
6. Under Five Mortality  Beta std error beta-
weight 
t-value error  prob
Constant  1241.548 171.617 xx 7.234 0.000
% world population  -0.491 1.288 -0.019  -0.381  0.704
Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 
(%) 
7.101 2.947 0.143 2.410 0.017
MNC PEN INWARD  0.293 0.146 0.102  2.007  0.047
DYN MNC PEN 95-2005  -0.122 0.140 -0.046  -0.874  0.384
public education expenditure per GNP  -1.880 1.670 -0.061  -1.126  0.262
ln GDP  -243.800 39.620 -4.688  -6.153  0.000
ln  GDP^2  12.051 2.266 4.035 5.318 0.000




Appendix 1: Data Sources for the selected variables of the final model 
IMF http://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/index.php 







  MNC PEN increase in MNC penetration 1995 - 2005 
  MNC PEN 1995 
UNDP Human Development Report Office http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/data/ 
  % world population 
  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
  DYN 1990-2005 real economic growth rate 
  Life expectancy at birth 2000/2005 
  ln GDP per capita in PPP $ 
  ln GDP per capita in PPP $^2 
  public education expenditure per GDP 
  RAT2020: quintile ratio (difference in the incomes between the richest and the 
poorest 20% in society 
  total population, 2005 
  Under-five mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 2005 
United Nations Statistics 
 http://unstats.un.org/unsd/Demographic/Products/socind/unemployment.htm  
  Unemployment rate, latest available year 
United States Central Intelligence Agency  
http://www.photius.com/rankings/spreadsheets_2008/population_2008.xls (based on 
US CIA)  
  % world population 
  Annual population growth rate, 1975-2005 (%) 
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Albania 0.0500  0.9 8.51 3.29 3.1 8.51278 5.2 4.1 75.7 23.0 2.00 18
Algeria 0.5142  2.4 3.88 4.29 5.1 8.79528 1.1 6.1 71.0 18.0 3.92 39
Angola 0.2516  2.9 58.50 -21.52 .. 7.68708 1.5 .. 41.0 9.31 260
Antigua and Barbuda  0.0016  0.3 88.27 51.94 .. 9.44034 1.5 .. .. 8.0 0.00 12
Argentina 0.6049  1.3 9.87 20.23 3.5 9.49537 1.1 17.6 74.3 9.0 0.70 18
Armenia 0.0469  0.2 5.13 22.64 2.0 8.31899 4.4 5.0 71.4 10.0 0.00 29
Australia 0.3173  1.3 28.00 1.14 5.5 10.31993 2.5 7.0 80.4 4.0 0.65 6
Austria 0.1297  0.3 8.23 14.53 5.4 10.38208 1.9 4.4 78.9 4.0 0.18 5
Azerbaijan 0.1313  1.3 10.72 79.35 3.0 8.33159 2.6 66.8 16.0 12.33 89
Bahamas 0.0047  1.8 21.65 80.22 .. 9.78937 0.4 .. 71.1 8.0 -0.50 15
Bahrain 0.0109  3.3 41.10 20.75 4.4 9.94069 2.3 .. 74.8 6.0 3.47 11
Bangladesh 2.3961  2.2 3.91 1.81 2.2 7.53369 2.9 4.6 62.0 4.0 5.38 73
Barbados 0.0047  0.6 12.14 2.61 7.2 9.66269 1.5 .. 76.0 10.0 0.50 12
Belarus 0.1532  0.1 0.36 7.53 5.9 8.84937 2.2 4.5 68.4 1.65 12
Belgium 0.1626  0.2 37.04 90.30 3.1 10.34483 1.7 4.9 78.2 8.0 0.29 5
Belize 0.0047  2.4 28.28 27.08 5.0 8.81685 2.3 .. 75.6 11.0 2.00 17
Benin 0.1329  3.2 2.25 4.27 3.2 6.99485 1.4 6.0 54.4 1.0 3.04 150
Bhutan 0.0094  1.9 0.91 1.66 4.1 7.58528 5.6 .. 63.5 3.0 6.62 75
Bolivia 0.1438  2.2 23.30 28.07 4.9 7.90839 1.3 42.3 63.9 5.0 2.90 65
Bosnia and Herzegovina    31.0 0.50
Botswana 0.0281  2.7 25.46 -17.17 8.6 9.20483 4.8 31.5 46.6 18.0 14.35 120
Brazil 2.9197  1.8 6.80 15.37 5.1 9.01128 1.1 23.7 71.0 9.0 2.17 33
Brunei Darussalam  0.0063  2.8 12.86 86.06 .. 9.86319 -0.8 .. 76.3 5.0 0.60 9
Bulgaria 0.1204  -0.4 3.40 47.55 3.2 8.99690 1.5 4.4 72.4 9.0 -1.00 15
Burkina Faso  0.2173  2.8 2.77 -1.37 3.6 7.06390 1.3 6.9 50.7 2.0 4.09 191
Burundi 0.1235  2.5 3.37 2.58 4.0 6.51767 -2.8 9.5 47.4 0.0 3.83 190
Cambodia 0.2188  2.3 10.76 28.51 2.9 7.79276 5.5 6.9 56.8 2.0 2.99 143  36
Cameroon 0.2782  2.7 11.70 7.15 .. 7.68432 0.6 9.1 49.9 7.0 2.64 149
Canada 0.5048  1.1 20.86 13.59 6.9 10.35019 2.2 5.5 79.8 6.0 1.16 6
Cape Verde  0.0078  2.0 7.74 28.98 .. 8.65295 3.4 .. 70.2 23.0 2.96 35
Central African Republic  0.0656  2.4 7.53 4.51 .. 6.99760 -0.6 32.7 43.3 3.10 193
Chad 0.1579  3.0 22.89 41.38 1.7 7.64492 1.7 .. 50.5 1.0 2.51 208
Chile 0.2548  1.5 33.91 28.84 3.6 9.29413 3.8 18.7 77.9 6.0 3.03 10
China 20.5220  1.2 13.36 -1.54 2.3 8.68203 8.8 10.7 72.0 4.0 7.51 27
Colombia 0.7018  1.9 6.93 23.08 4.4 8.88958 0.6 25.3 71.7 11.0 1.25 21
Comoros 0.0125  3.1 8.35 -2.00 .. 7.57199 -0.4 .. 63.0 20.0 1.49 71
Congo 0.0563  2.8 48.28 5.63 6.1 6.88551 -1.0 .. 53.0 5.54 108
Congo (Dem Rep of the)  0.9175  3.0 9.59 3.20 .. 6.55820 -5.2 .. 45.0 11.87 205
Costa Rica  0.0672  2.5 3.49 23.72 5.4 9.15705 2.3 14.2 78.1 5.0 1.50 12
Côte d'Ivoire  0.2907  3.5 14.12 8.89 5.0 7.34666 -0.5 9.7 46.8 4.23 195
Croatia 0.0719  0.2 2.64 34.89 5.3 9.40845 2.6 4.8 74.9 10.0 0.25 7
Cuba 0.1766  0.6 0.12 0.08 6.7 3.5 .. 77.2 2.0 7
Cyprus 0.0125  1.1 -0.85 52.02 4.5 10.03474 2.3 .. 79.0 5.0 2.10 5
Czech Republic  0.1594  0.1 13.30 35.34 5.1 9.87344 1.9 3.5 75.4 5.0 0.08 4
Denmark 0.0844  0.2 13.08 31.84 8.1 10.37080 1.9 4.3 77.3 4.0 0.40 5
Djibouti 0.0125  4.3 4.59 17.91 .. 7.59740 -2.7 .. 53.4 44.0 5.39 133
Dominica 0.0016  (.) 87.37 41.37 .. 8.63817 1.3 .. .. 11.0 2.00 15
Dominican Republic  0.1485  2.0 -15.37 31.10 2.3 8.91584 3.9 14.4 70.8 18.0 2.00 31
East Timor    22.73 24.37 7.88
Ecuador 0.2048  2.1 17.92 8.60 3.5 8.28476 0.8 17.3 74.2 8.0 1.00 25
Egypt 1.1379  2.1 21.32 9.67 4.8 8.34546 2.4 5.1 69.8 11.0 3.00 33
El Salvador  0.1047  1.6 3.08 21.32 2.5 8.52536 1.6 20.9 70.7 7.0 0.50 27
Equatorial Guinea  0.0078  2.6 105.39 -4.47 1.7 9.92867 16.6 .. 49.3 24.0 -2.83 205
Eritrea 0.0703  2.5 .. 1.8 6.88449 0.3 .. 55.2 4.72 78
Estonia 0.0203  -0.2 17.90 63.10 7.2 9.58569 4.2 6.4 70.9 5.0 -1.05 7
Ethiopia 1.2348  2.8 2.25 22.60 4.0 6.62804 1.5 4.3 50.7 5.0 6.54 164
Fiji 0.0125  1.2 29.32 -3.56 5.4 8.71045 1.4 .. 67.8 5.0 1.20 18
Finland 0.0813  0.4 6.48 21.41 7.5 10.30732 2.5 3.8 78.4 7.0 -1.24 4
France 0.9534  0.5 12.19 17.21 6.0 10.28534 1.6 5.6 79.6 8.0 0.41 5
Gabon 0.0203  2.6 15.14 -13.08 2.9 8.79830 -0.4 .. 56.8 18.0 2.75 91
Gambia 0.0250  3.5 48.75 32.00 4.9 7.59639 0.1 11.2 58.0 4.42 137
Georgia 0.0703  -0.3 1.18 38.03 5.2 7.95297 0.2 8.3 70.5 13.0 3.00 45
Germany 1.2926  0.2 6.58 10.48 4.8 10.25072 1.4 4.3 78.7 9.0 -1.00 5  37
Ghana 0.3517  2.6 12.79 7.24 4.2 7.71423 2.0 8.4 58.5 10.0 4.72 112
Gibraltar  
Greece 0.1735  0.7 8.51 3.31 3.1 10.00807 2.5 6.2 78.3 8.0 -0.60 5
Grenada 0.0016  0.4 72.00 97.37 4.7 8.98982 2.5 .. 67.7 15.0 1.00 21
Guatemala 0.1985  2.4 16.85 2.18 1.7 8.36939 1.3 20.3 69.0 3.0 1.80 43
Guinea 0.1407  2.7 3.34 16.50 1.9 7.68708 1.2 7.3 53.7 4.14 150
Guinea-Bissau 0.0250  3.0 7.75 10.97 .. 6.58203 -2.6 10.3 45.5 3.10 200
Guyana 0.0109  (.) 73.10 46.68 5.0 8.39818 3.2 .. 63.6 12.0 3.45 63
Haiti 0.1454  2.0 6.57 -2.80 .. 7.54539 -2.0 26.6 58.1 7.0 2.00 120
Honduras 0.1063  2.6 14.03 19.87 3.6 7.96416 0.5 17.2 68.6 4.0 1.90 40
Hong Kong, China (SAR)  0.1110  1.6 157.76 136.55 2.9 10.33598 2.4 9.7 81.5 4.0 0.52 ..
Hungary 0.1579  -0.1 24.63 31.45 4.6 9.72997 3.1 3.8 72.4 7.0 -0.45 8
Iceland 0.0047  1.0 1.84 27.06 5.4 10.40581 2.2 .. 81.0 2.0 -0.20 3
India 17.7305  2.0 1.52 3.95 3.2 8.05166 4.2 4.9 62.9 5.0 5.61 74
Indonesia 3.5339  1.7 9.29 5.20 1.4 8.19119 2.1 5.2 68.6 9.0 3.50 36
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  1.0847  2.4 2.09 0.11 4.0 8.92599 2.3 9.7 69.5 11.0 3.04 36
Iraq   -0.64 2.93 11.0 6.69
Ireland 0.0641  0.9 65.85 15.58 6.0 10.56687 6.2 5.6 77.8 5.0 -3.00 6
Israel 0.1047  2.3 6.23 21.76 7.6 10.10160 1.5 7.9 79.7 7.0 0.27 6
Italy 0.9159  0.2 5.80 6.91 4.9 10.24637 1.3 6.5 79.9 6.0 -0.39 4
Jamaica 0.0422  1.0 35.75 35.46 7.5 8.33399 0.7 6.9 72.0 9.0 -0.30 20
Japan 1.9991  0.5 0.64 1.58 3.6 10.28367 0.8 3.4 81.9 4.0 0.52 4
Jordan 0.0860  3.5 21.95 82.95 7.9 8.45276 1.6 6.9 71.3 12.0 4.00 26
Kazakhstan 0.2376  0.2 14.09 30.34 4.4 8.91463 2.0 5.6 64.9 8.0 1.50 73
Kenya 0.5564  3.2 6.26 -0.31 6.5 7.03878 -0.1 8.2 51.0 4.01 120
Korea (Republic of)  0.7487  1 1.84 11.42 3.7 9.92813 4.5 4.7 77.0 3.0 1.53 5
Kuwait 0.0422  3.3 0.35 0.45 5.0 9.87220 0.6 .. 76.9 2.39 11
Kyrgyzstan 0.0813  1.5 9.67 13.21 5.3 7.56786 -1.3 4.4 65.3 8.0 2.93 67
Lao People's Dem Republic  0.0891  2.2 11.85 11.45 2.1 7.57763 3.8 5.4 61.9 1.0 4.72 79
Latvia 0.0359  -0.2 12.42 18.31 6.3 9.36332 3.6 6.8 71.3 6.0 -2.04 11
Lebanon 0.0625  1.3 1.26 70.01 2.5 8.67197 2.8 .. 71.0 4.00 30
Lesotho 0.0313  1.8 19.17 17.71 8.4 7.87055 2.3 44.2 44.6 27.0 2.98 132
Liberia   2001.11 -1548.31 6.0 7.53
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  0.0922  2.9 3.00 2.22 .. 8.93195 .. 72.7 2.80 19
Lichtenstein  
Lithuania 0.0531  0.1 5.42 26.49 5.5 9.48090 1.9 6.3 72.1 4.0 -3.00 9  38
Luxembourg 0.0078  0.8 37.04 82.56 4.0 11.15569 3.3 .. 78.2 4.0 -0.20 5
Macedonia (TFYR)  0.0313  0.6 1.94 33.95 5.1 8.79634 -0.1 7.5 73.4 35.0 1.00 17
Madagascar 0.2907  2.9 5.45 -0.71 1.9 6.75344 -0.7 11 57.3 3.0 2.03 119
Malawi 0.2063  3.1 16.19 8.02 5.4 6.47080 1.0 11.6 45.0 8.0 6.00 125
Malaysia 0.4017  2.5 32.34 0.07 4.9 9.23757 3.3 12.4 73.0 3.0 1.34 12
Maldives 0.0047  2.6 15.27 8.74 6.4 3.8 .. 65.6 14.0 2.90 42
Mali 0.1813  2.5 12.57 3.32 2.2 6.90575 2.2 12.2 51.8 9.0 4.09 218
Malta 0.0063  0.9 16.29 56.68 5.1 9.84581 2.7 .. 78.6 6.0 1.10 6
Mauritania 0.0469  2.7 6.71 78.66 5.1 7.57044 0.3 7.4 62.2 21.0 4.69 125
Mauritius 0.0188  1.1 6.26 6.54 4.6 9.39491 3.8 .. 72.0 9.0 2.28 15
Mexico 1.6302  1.8 14.37 11.91 4.9 9.19044 1.5 12.8 74.9 3.0 1.02 27
Moldova 0.0610  (.) 5.52 29.83 10.6 7.45530 -3.5 5.3 67.9 5.0 0.00 16
Monaco   4.0
Mongolia 0.0406  1.9 3.07 31.26 5.7 7.62852 2.2 9.1 65.0 14.0 4.28 49
Morocco 0.4767  1.9 13.91 21.29 5.3 8.36846 1.5 7.2 69.6 10.0 4.40 40
Mozambique 0.3204  2.2 15.56 24.08 .. 7.12044 4.3 7.2 44.0 2.0 4.00 145
Myanmar 0.7502  1.6 15.59 25.27 1.2 6.93440 6.6 .. 59.9 6.0 4.03 105
Namibia 0.0313  2.7 48.75 -8.73 9.1 8.91166 1.4 56.1 51.5 22.0 1.80 62
Nepal 0.4236  2.3 0.33 1.50 3.2 7.30653 2.0 9.1 61.3 9.0 3.25 74
Netherlands 0.2548  0.6 27.70 43.57 5.1 10.36688 1.9 5.1 78.7 4.0 -0.66 5
New Zealand  0.0641  0.9 41.98 5.73 7.3 10.06105 2.1 6.8 79.2 4.0 0.46 6
Nicaragua 0.0860  2.2 12.06 38.06 3.9 8.19809 1.8 8.8 70.8 5.0 1.00 37
Niger 0.2079  3.3 19.54 -16.46 2.3 6.65801 -0.5 20.7 54.5 1.0 4.51 256
Nigeria 2.2101  2.8 37.05 -4.98 0.7 7.05099 0.8 9.7 46.6 4.0 2.61 194
Norway 0.0719  0.5 12.71 12.50 7.4 10.55722 2.7 3.9 79.3 2.0 0.32 4
Oman 0.0391  3.4 16.14 -8.16 4.5 9.63292 1.8 .. 74.2 3.80 12
Pakistan 2.4711  2.8 6.64 2.71 2.7 7.70751 1.3 4.3 63.6 5.0 3.50 99
Panama 0.0500  2.1 36.74 29.29 5.1 8.89261 2.2 23.9 74.7 7.0 4.04 24
Papua New Guinea  0.0953  2.5 34.43 5.46 .. 7.84110 0.2 12.6 56.7 3.0 3.70 74
Paraguay 0.0922  2.5 7.97 9.19 4.0 8.47908 -0.6 27.8 70.8 6.0 1.50 23
Peru 0.4267  2.0 10.27 9.73 2.9 8.64435 2.2 18.6 69.9 7.0 4.49 27
Philippines 1.3223  2.3 13.69 1.06 3.4 8.43685 1.6 9.7 70.3 6.0 33
Poland 0.5971  0.4 5.64 24.21 7.5 9.47070 4.3 5.6 74.6 10.0 1.26 7
Portugal 0.1641  0.5 16.80 17.35 5.8 9.88476 2.1 8.0 77.2 8.0 -0.50 5
Puerto Rico    11.0
Qatar 0.0125  5.1 5.44 8.58 3.4 9.89566 .. 74.3 4.0 16.37 21  39
Reunion   29.0
Romania 0.3376  0.1 2.30 23.89 3.6 9.04547 1.6 4.9 71.3 6.0 -0.04 19
Russian Federation  2.2507  0.2 1.40 22.19 3.5 9.20049 -0.1 7.6 64.8 6.0 0.50 18
Rwanda 0.1438  2.5 3.94 -0.25 .. 7.14125 0.1 4.0 43.4 1.0 5.79 203
Saint Kitts and Nevis  (.)  0.3 105.98 96.32 3.8 9.44951 2.9 .. .. 0.00 20
Saint Lucia  0.0031  1.3 93.28 39.76 9.8 8.75211 0.9 .. 72.5 21.0 0.00 14
Saint Vincent & Grenadines  0.0016  0.7 68.28 97.27 .. 8.76374 1.6 .. 70.6 20.0 1.20 20
Samoa 0.0031  0.7 14.35 -1.49 .. 8.63284 2.5 .. 70.0 5.0 3.50 29
Sao Tome and Principe  0.0031  2.1 -0.13 57.35 .. 7.11558 0.5 .. 64.3 17.0 6.00 118
Saudi Arabia  0.3689  3.9 11.99 -1.36 7.5 9.53423 0.1 .. 71.6 6.0 2.90 26
Senegal 0.1844  2.8 7.82 -3.65 3.7 7.44600 1.2 7.5 61.6 3.43 136
Seychelles 0.0016  1.1 68.13 43.77 7.9 9.72029 1.5 .. .. 5.0 2.56 13
Sierra Leone  0.0875  2.1 19.40 0.58 .. 6.32972 -1.4 57.6 41.0 3.0 5.30 282
Singapore 0.0672  2.2 78.21 85.84 3.0 10.24271 3.6 9.7 78.8 4.0 -0.11 3
Slovakia 0.0844  0.4 6.63 42.77 5.0 9.59035 2.8 4.0 73.8 11.0 1.92 8
Slovenia 0.0313  0.5 12.90 7.77 5.7 9.94937 3.2 3.9 76.8 5.0 1.38 4
Solomon Islands  0.0078  3.0 34.53 8.08 .. 7.50329 -2.4 .. 62.3 32.0 3.43 29
South Africa  0.7487  2.1 9.93 22.70 8.0 9.32295 0.6 17.9 53.4 23.0 1.90 68
Spain 0.6783  0.7 17.52 15.43 5.0 10.12851 2.5 6.0 80.0 8.0 -0.71 5
Sri Lanka  0.2985  1.1 9.94 0.09 3.4 8.38708 3.7 5.1 70.8 6.0 3.59 14
Sudan 0.5767  2.6 1.47 30.03 1.4 7.57507 3.5 .. 56.4 5.04 90
Suriname 0.0078  0.7 3.5 1.1 .. 69.1 13.0 2.50 39
Swaziland 0.0172  2.5 39.24 -9.47 5.7 8.63728 0.2 23.8 43.9 23.0 2.64 160
Sweden 0.1407  0.3 12.24 34.69 8.3 10.29353 2.1 4.0 80.1 6.0 0.17 4
Switzerland 0.1157  0.5 18.06 27.82 5.4 10.40547 0.6 5.5 80.7 4.0 -0.33 5
Syrian Arab Republic  0.2954  3.1 47.82 -17.57 3.1 8.19146 1.4 .. 73.1 10.0 2.84 15
Taiwan   5.75 6.38 0.01
Tajikistan 0.1032  2.1 3.25 9.98 2.2 7.09174 -4 5.2 65.9 3.00 71
Tanzania(United Rep of)  0.6018  2.9 11.47 22.46 .. 6.51323 1.7 5.8 49.7 5.0 5.66 122
Thailand 0.9847  1.3 10.53 23.68 4.8 8.99838 2.7 7.7 68.6 1.0 1.04 21
Togo 0.0969  3.1 19.52 14.39 4.5 7.33694 .. 57.6 2.15 139
Trinidad and Tobago  0.0203  0.9 72.61 4.61 4.4 9.40771 4.3 8.3 69.0 7.0 2.00 19
Tunisia 0.1579  1.9 60.83 -2.82 7.7 8.95777 3.3 7.9 73.0 14.0 3.80 24
Turkey 1.1410  1.9 6.69 8.07 2.2 8.95584 1.7 9.3 70.8 10.0 1.50 29
Turkmenistan 0.0750  2.2 18.96 22.34 .. 8.43033 -6.8 7.7 62.4 6.96 104
Uganda 0.4517  3.3 4.58 17.44 2.6 7.29845 3.2 8.4 47.8 3.0 5.50 136  40
Ukraine 0.7330  -0.1 1.85 18.13 7.3 8.76312 -2.4 4.1 67.6 7.0 1.02 17
United Arab Emirates  0.0641  6.8 4.14 17.37 1.8 10.08814 -0.9 .. 77.8 3.0 1.55 9
United Kingdom  0.9409  0.2 17.59 20.34 5.3 10.33595 2.5 7.2 78.5 5.0 -0.40 6
United States  4.6858  1.0 7.25 5.89 5.4 10.58850 2.1 8.4 77.4 5.0 -0.05 7
Uruguay 0.0516  0.5 5.84 11.27 3.3 9.15070 0.8 10.2 75.3 9.0 2.00 15
Uzbekistan 0.4158  2.1 0.79 7.88 7.7 7.53316 0.3 4.0 66.5 7.00 68
Vanuatu 0.0031  2.5 102.23 25.40 4.8 8.02322 .. 68.4 3.50 38
Venezuela (Bolivarian Rep)  0.4173  2.5 11.01 19.58 5.2 8.70666 -1 10.6 72.8 7.0 -0.50 21
Viet Nam  1.3285  1.9 34.48 24.36 3.0 7.91754 5.9 6.0 73.0 2.0 3.97 19
Yemen 0.3298  3.6 32.50 -27.45 7.0 6.77878 1.5 5.6 60.3 12.0 4.72 102
Zambia 0.1797  2.7 44.74 6.88 2.2 6.84907 -0.3 8.0 39.2 13.0 4.55 182
Zimbabwe 0.2048  2.5 6.93 55.17 7.1 7.63289 -2.1 12 40.0 4.0 132
 